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In "Realism and Respect," Professor Baldner
attempts to defend holistic environmental ethics
against criticisms I made of it in my book,
Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1987). While I very
much appreciate the care Professor Baldner has
given to accurately stating and thoughtfully
critiquing my views, I do not find that critique
compelling for the following reasons.
First, the fundamental, theoretical flaw in
environmental ethics of the sort Baldner advocates
is the belief that values can exist without
reference to the capacities of sentient beings. The
prevalence of this mistaken belief among
environmental ethicists may be due to the use of
"value" in phrases like "its value for evolution." In
such phrases "value" refers to the role played by
something in evolution.
This role can be
completely
explicated
m
non-evaluative
descriptions of how this thing interacted with
other things to contribute to the course of
evolution. That this can be done shows that the
term is being used non-evaluatively in such
phrases. Where evaluation enters here is in the
presumption that the course or products of
evolution are good, fulfilling a purpose, or
otherwise worthy. That is a value something has
not merely "for evolution" but for a sentient being
contemplating evolution.
Baldner attempts to support his value theory by
contending that "if the existence of the natural
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consummg it. Finally, we can recognize that
preserving natural systems is important for
preserving our own existence; the uninhibited
consumption of natural resources may leave us
unable to sustain ourselves. Thus, one can share
the environmentalists' love of nature and dismay
at its continuing destruction at the hands of
human profiteers and can develop moral
philosophies which accommodate those feelings
without having to regard the natural environment
as an end-in-itself.
Finally, Baldner contends that is "arrogant" and
"paternalistic" morally to condemn something as
definitive of the natural order as predation.
However, it is in the nature of morality to devise
ideals of a better world and to work toward
realizing them. This entails judging this world to
be less than ideal and working to change it. One
could restrict moral evaluations to the products of
human activity, but that would be arbitrary: what
makes suffering (prima facie) morally bad is not
that it is the result of human activity but that it
is suffering. Our commitment to making the
world a morally better place impels us to make
moral evaluations of the natural order. There
need be nothing either arrogant or paternalistic in
making and acting on such evaluations, provided
we recognize the very limited nature of our
understanding and our power to make
improvements.
Of course, we could give up the moral
enterprise altogether and maintain that whatever
is is right. But even environmental ethicists seem
unwilling to do this, since they are intent on
condemning attitudes which have been definitive
of Western culture and on substantially
transforming that culture. Is this arrogant and
paternalistic on their part?

environment is not dependent upon us, neither is
its value." However, this contention is false.
Values are supervenient properties; it follows that
things can exist without value and that the source
of their existence can differ from the source of
their value. Once again, Baldner's mistake here
may be due to confusing playing a role with
having value: he holds the natural environment to
comprise a system; consequently, anything that
comes to exist in that environment will be playing
a role in a system. Once again, playing a role is
not the same as having value; on a world where
sentient life arises, which no sentient being visits,
and which otherwise has no effect on sentient life,
the wind may play a role in the geological
evolution of the topography, but there is no value
to it. There is merely the replacement of one
configuration by another.
Second, Baldner sees focusing on sentience in
value theory as unjustifiably holding that sentient
beings are especially "important" by virtue of
being "similar to human beings" (lingering
This is doubly wrong.
anthropocentrism).
Sentient beings are not at the center of a
consistent and adequate value theory because they
are more important than nonsentient beings or
environments; they are at the center because it is
through their relations to sentient beings that
things come to have value. Furthermore, there is
nothing anthropocentric here; being sentient is not
a relational property. Describing a being as
sentient is no more comparing it to humans than
is saying it has a mouth. A moral philosopher
does not have to be misanthropic in order not to
be anthropocentric.
Third, like other environmental ethicists, Baldner
seems to envisage only two ways in which nature
may be morally evaluated: either nature is merely
a resource to be cut down, dug up, and otherwise
transformed and consumed to fulfill human
desires, or nature has overriding value of its own,
is an end-in-itself which must be preserved as is.
This is a false dilemma; we can recognize that the
value of nature is not limited to being a resource
for human consumption without regarding it as an
end-in-itself. First, we can acknowledge that
nature is of value for sentient but nonhuman
beings. Second, we can recognize that many
humans value nature remaining as it is; they value
contemplating or communing with nature, not just
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